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In the last decade or so, numerous papers 
have been devoted to empirical investigations 
based on contract theory. Many contributions 
use insurance data, and specifically files pro-
vided by firms. A typical paper would analyze 
the relationship between individual characteris-
tics, the contracts chosen and the corresponding 
“outcome,” as measured by claims.
The natural next step in this research agenda 
is to model empirically market equilibrium on 
insurance markets. Empirical models of com-
petitive insurance markets are important in 
many respects. First, such models are an indis-
pensable first step for the empirical analysis 
of existing markets. The discussion of optimal 
pricing strategies or the definition of new insur-
ance contract would greatly benefit from such 
models. From a policy perspective, the design 
of any regulation requires estimating its likely 
impact on the market allocation. For instance, 
while a ban on specific pricing options (based, 
say, on gender or age) is often advocated on ethi-
cal grounds, a precise assessment of its impact 
on insurance markets is needed before any deci-
sion is made; and an empirical model is required 
to provide such an assessment.
 One may mention, among many others, Chiappori 
and Salanié (997, 2000), Amy Finkelstein and James 
Poterba (2004) or Alma Cohen and Liran Einav (2007). See 
Chiappori and Salanié (2002) or Salanié (2003) for early 
surveys.
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From a purely theoretical perspective, any 
description of insurance markets that aims at a 
modicum of realism needs to come to terms with 
a host of complex features (horizontal differen-
tiation of products, unobserved heterogeneity of 
preferences, frictions of various types), the theo-
retical analysis of which may be forbiddingly 
complex. A simple model that can be solved or 
at least numerically simulated may, in that case, 
be particularly helpful. Finally, a tractable model 
of insurance equilibrium can be used to run 
experiments, which should help us understand 
individual behavior in such strategic settings as 
competition under asymmetric information.
On the other hand, modeling insurance mar-
kets raises several theoretical and empirical 
issues, starting, of course, with the well-known 
pitfalls in modeling equilibrium in contracts. 
The goal of the present paper is to discuss 
these problems and summarize the knowledge 
acquired so far. We successively discuss model-
ing of the demand side, the supply side, and the 
equilibrium itself.
I.  Modeling Demand
Modeling the demand for insurance requires 
understanding various aspects: the nature of the 
risk, the characterization of the contracts traded, 
an assessment of the various frictions involved 
(horizontal differentiation for instance), the 
nature of information asymmetries (if any), and, 
finally, knowledge of the joint distribution of 
risk, risk aversion, and income in the population 
of insurees.
A. Risk
The simplest theoretical models involve only 
two contingencies: a negative outcome occurs 
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with some given probability and implies a given 
loss with a money equivalent L. This basic 
framework can be extended in various direc-
tions. The loss may be modeled as a continuous 
variable. In some cases, several correlated risks 
have to be considered simultaneously (e.g., lia-
bility and damage risks in car insurance.) More 
complex issues arise when utility is state depen-
dent, since the risk then cannot be considered 
as purely monetary. For instance, the benefits 
derived from a life insurance contract depend 
on the current utility, for a person, of a future 
transfer to the offspring after the person’s death. 
The underlying intertemporal rate of substitu-
tion/altruistic motive may be hard to assess, let 
alone to distinguish from risk aversion. Several 
lines of business, including health insurance, 
raise similar questions.
Moreover, many insurance contracts have 
dynamic features, which raises specific issues. 
Annuity contracts differ in their degree of front-
loading, a property that can be used to screen 
insurees in a context of asymmetric information 
on longevity (an aspect discussed by Finkelstein, 
Poterba, and Casey Rothschild 2006, and Eytan 
Sheshinski 2007). In this context, the intertem-
poral distribution of payments implied by each 
contract must be modeled with care. Many con-
tracts can be renewed each year, and the dynam-
ics involved can be quite complex. For instance, 
with asymmetric learning, whereby insurees 
acquire throughout time more information than 
insurers about their type, changes in the con-
tract purchased may carry information about the 
agent’s updated belief. In a similar vein, issues 
related to preexisting conditions are probably 
the main problem facing private provision of 
health insurance.
Each of these issues requires care when mod-
eling contracts. In the simplest framework, a 
contract is simply a (premium, deductible) pair. 
With a continuum of possible losses, or in an 
explicitly intertemporal framework, a contract 
is represented as a continuous (or dynamic) 
schedule; the characterization of optimal 
or equilibrium contracts therefore requires 
optimal control theory or dynamic games. 
Moreover, in a dynamic framework, commit-
ment issues become crucial. Finally, a specific 
but important aspect of insurance economet-
rics is the distinction between accident and 
claims. With experience rating, for instance, 
the decision to file a claim after an accident is 
endogenous and will in general depend on the 
contract, a feature that must in many cases be 
taken into account.
B. Preferences
Individual risk aversion is a key determinant 
of the demand for insurance. Several papers 
have recently been devoted to the estimation of 
the corresponding parameters (see, for instance, 
Robert B. Barsky et al. 997; Cohen and Einav 
2007; Chiappori and Monica Paiella 2006 (CP 
below)). Some clear conclusions emerge from 
this line of work. First, risk aversion is extremely 
heterogeneous; even conditional on observable 
characteristics, risk attitudes differ much more 
across individuals than risk itself. Second, con-
stant relative risk aversion provides a reason-
ably good approximation of individual attitude 
toward risk, at least in an expected utility set-
ting. In particular, CP, using panel data on port-
folio composition, show that changes in income 
result in compensating variations in portfolio 
composition that leave the fraction invested in 
risky assets constant. The same studies suggest 
that relative risk aversion (RRA) is negatively 
correlated with income, although the correlation 
is very small; therefore, assuming that RRA is 
distributed independently of income is (surpris-
ingly) an acceptable approximation. Finally, the 
distribution of RRA seems to be fit rather well 
by a lognormal, although the coefficients gov-
erning this distribution vary between studies; 
for instance, the mean of log RRA is estimated 
at 0.5 by CP, while it is calibrated at almost 2 by 
Barsky et al. Interestingly, the standard devia-
tion is close to  in both studies.
In many studies, however, a constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA) approximation is used. 
Such an approximation is convenient when no 
data are available on individual income; it is 
justified when the risk is small with respect to 
income. Note, however, that if we accept the 
CRRA context, a CARA approximation intro-
duces a correlation between ARA and income y, 
since log 1ARA2 5 log 1RRA2 2 log y.
Once individual risk, contracts, and risk aver-
sion have been modeled, one can compute for 
each potential customer i the certainty equiv-
alent of each available contract k, say Dik for 
k 5 , … , k, as well as that of no insurance, 
denoted Di0. Given the joint distribution of 
these three determinants, the investigator then 
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obtains the distributions of these certainty 
equivalents2.
C. Demand
In order to calibrate individual demand, one 
must allow for various frictions. In particular, 
the law of one price is clearly violated, even for 
apparently quite homogeneous products such as 
the liability guarantee in car insurance. A ran-
dom utility model is a natural way to take this 
into account. Insurees are supposed to choose 
the option that maximizes a sum Dik 1 e
i
k , where 
the eik are i.i.d. random perturbations that follow 
a type- extreme value distribution.
Then, the probability of agent i choosing con-




 P ik 5     ,a e gDis
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where /g is a “viscosity” parameter. This form 




 P ik 5        ,a As e gDis
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where the (unknown) Ak parameters capture dif-
fering brand recognitions, density of insurance 
retail outlets and so on. Note that Ak may be 
endogeneized—i.e., “purchased” by the insurer 
through advertising for instance. Similarly, 
the viscosity coefficient /g may be product-
or company-specific, and may vary with insu-
rees’ observed or unobserved characteristics. A 
particularly interesting situation obtains when 
demand from long-time clients is less elastic; 
such “customer loyalty” or switching costs gen-
erates rich pricing dynamics, since future profits 
are correlated with current market shares.
Finally, aggregate demand and the average 
accident rate for a given contract obtain by sum-
ming the probabilities of losses of the insurees 
who choose this contract, weighted by the prob-
ability that they do so, over their observed char-
acteristics and unobserved heterogeneity.
2 As in portfolio choice, the assumption that preferences 
are CARA and disturbances are normally distributed is 
attractive here, as it makes computations easier; but even 
so, numerical integration must be used.
D. information
A final and crucial component of the model 
relates to the information available to each con-
sumer. It is natural to assume that risk aversion 
is the client’s private information. Regarding 
risk, two polar cases can be considered—but 
they hardly exhaust the possibilities. In one 
case, individuals know exactly their risk class, 
and the insurer cannot use that information, 
say, because regulation prohibits the use of spe-
cific indicators (race, gender, age, …… ). Then, the 
model entails bidimensional adverse selection. 
Alternatively, we may assume that individuals 
have no informational advantage over insur-
ers; then, adverse selection bears on risk aver-
sion only, and is relevant only to the extent that 
competition is imperfect (Chiappori et al. 2006). 
Intermediate cases (e.g., agents receive a private 
signal about their accident probability) can be 
considered as well. Finally, the introduction of 
moral hazard requires, in addition, modeling 
a prevention cost within the utility function of 
each consumer. This raises very thorny issues: 
is the cost homogenous, publicly known, cor-
related with risk, or with risk aversion? To our 
knowledge, little progress has been made in that 
direction.
II.  Modeling Supply
While modeling demand on insurance mar-
kets is a challenge, modeling supply is much 
easier. The space of product characteristics is 
usually low-dimensional; e.g., in car insurance 
a product is mostly defined by whether it carries 
damage insurance, liability, and a deductible 
and premium (and perhaps some minor variants 
on fire and theft insurance). Similarly, many ele-
ments of the cost structure of insurers are fairly 
simple: cost per contract, per product, and per 
client, and variable costs when payments are 
made. Most of these costs can be estimated, 
calibrated, or simulated. Costs of entry and exit, 
as elsewhere, are a more difficult problem of 
course.
On the other hand, dynamic issues in insur-
ers’ strategies are quite interesting, for several 
reasons. As mentioned above, switching costs 
can be readily be introduced by assuming that 
the viscosity parameter /g varies with a client’s 
seniority. In some cases, the parameter can 
moreover be directly influenced by the insurer 
VOL. 98 NO. 2 149MODELiNg COMPEtitiON AND MARkEt EquiLiBRiuM iN iNsuRANCE: EMPiRiCAL issuEs
(say, through advertising). Commitment issues 
are more complex. When an insurance company 
sells a contract that commits it for the long term 
(e.g., a life insurance policy with a guaranteed 
renewal clause), it is de facto offering an option, 
the pricing and hedging of which raise delicate 
problems. For instance, selective attrition may 
be a serious concern; and computing provisions 
is known to be a difficult problem in life insur-
ance. Finally, regulation typically constrains the 
dynamics of capital and profit, since past losses, 
insofar as they reduce available capital, limit the 
current size of operations.
III.  Modeling Equilibrium
When modeling market equilibrium in an 
insurance context, a clear distinction should be 
drawn between exclusive and nonexclusive con-
tracts. When contracts are not exclusive (as in 
the case of annuities), pricing schemes that are 
convex in coverage cannot be used, since the 
insurees can arbitrage over them. This affects 
the strategic nature of competition, particularly 
in the presence of asymmetric information. In 
that case, screening can take other forms, such 
as specific designs of contract dynamics (see 
Rothschild 2007).
The case of exclusive contracts is more famil-
iar, if only because of the large theoretical lit-
erature devoted to this situation. Still, the mere 
choice of an equilibrium concept is not clear. 
For instance, should equilibrium require non-
negative profit for each contract, or are cross 
subsidies allowed? Should one refer to equilibria 
à la Rothschild and Stiglitz, à la Wilson/Spence/
Miyazaki, à la Hellwig? And what should one 
do when the equilibrium fails to exist? From a 
theoretical perspective, the existence issue is 
especially difficult in the framework described 
above, because of its sheer complexity. Adverse 
selection is multidimensional (on risk and risk 
aversion), and the distribution of risk aversion 
at least is typically continuous. The various 
frictions introduced (finite elasticity, cost per 
contract and product, etc.) tend in general to 
make the existence of equilibrium more likely; 
still, robust examples of nonexistence can be 
found. An analytic derivation of the existence 
and uniqueness of the equilibrium (let alone its 
qualitative properties) is in general out of reach. 
The model can then be used to derive the results 
by simulations instead.
IV.  A Simulation Game
Finally, a simulation game can be constructed 
using the ideas presented above; the reader is 
referred to Chiappori and Salanié (2008) for a 
precise description. The main features can be 
summarized as follows. Each player is an insur-
ance company, faced with a demand simulated 
by the computer. Risk is modeled à la Mossin, 
i.e., as the occurrence of a single monetary loss. 
Various risk classes (corresponding to specific 
accident probability) are defined; in the simplest 
version, there are two of them, although the 
extension to continuous distributions is straight-
forward. Within each class, a random sample of 
risk aversions is drawn from some distribution, 
thus generating a set of consumer types; each 
type can have a specific weight. The behavior of 
a given type follows the ideas presented above.
In the static version of the game, a first stage 
is organized assuming symmetric information; 
in practice, each risk class is offered specific 
contracts. At each round, insurers compete in 
“contracts,” each of which is defined by a pre-
mium and a deductible; the model computes 
market shares and profits for each contract. 
Players/insurers are each provided with a simu-
lation tool based on the true characteristics of 
the virtual market; i.e., they can enter “guesses” 
about the other players’ strategies and test the 
market shares and profits generated by any con-
tract they may offer. This feature allows them to 
concentrate on the strategic aspects of the game. 
The second stage follows the same logic, but 
differentiation based on risk is prohibited; com-
panies may still offer several contracts, but each 
contract is freely available to any consumer. 
Finally, various dynamics can be introduced, 
along the lines discussed above. The game is 
currently being tested on a sample of players.
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